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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 After years of denial, the truth finally came out: The CIA carried 
out “brutal” interrogations of al-Qaeda suspects, involving extensive 
waterboarding described as a “series of near drownings,” sleep 
deprivation of up to a week, and medically unnecessary forced 
feedings.1  Unequivocally, and undeniably, what was conducted in 
the name of national security was torture, which is fundamentally 
opposed to the United States’ values.  Much of these abuses occurred 
at the secret prisons located at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where the 
government believed that the reach and protections of the 
Constitution did not extend. After years of wrangling between 
Congress and the Supreme Court the Supreme Court definitively 
ruled in 2008 that the detainees held at Guantanamo were protected 
by the Suspension Clause.2  Since then, debate has raged among legal 
scholars about what other protections may apply to the detainees.  
Additionally, Boumediene sparked a wide variety of lawsuits, 
challenging the government’s practices. 
 A particularly prevalent type of claims in post-Boumediene cases 
are Bivens claims by detainees.  One such case is Hamad v. Gates.3  
Hamad represents a typical claim made by such detainees, and is the 
focus of this note.  In Hamad, the Ninth Circuit held that a statute 
that had previously thought to be entirely overruled by Boumediene 
actually survived.  This statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e), stemmed from 
years of back-and-forth debate between the Supreme Court and 
Congress.  The result of this conflict is still unsettled.  The main issue 
is whether the Court’s primary concern in overruling the jurisdiction-
stripping statutes of Congress was in a separation-of-powers and a 
                                                            
* Third-year law student, Pepperdine University School of Law. 
1 Jeremy Asheknas, Hannah Fairfield, Josh Keller, and Paul Volpe, 7 Key 
Points From the C.I.A. Torture Report, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014) 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/09/world/cia-torture-report-key-
points.html. 
2 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008). 
3 732 F.3d at 990. 
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muscular enforcement of judicial protections, or a more limited, 
Suspension-Clause specific analysis. 
 In Part II, this note will examine the historical background of the 
Military Commissions, the Detainee Treatment Act, and the Military 
Commissions Act.4  It will also provide the Supreme Court’s 
responses to each of these, illustrating how each time the Court 
enforced its own jurisdiction to hear cases at Guantanamo finally 
culminated in the full application of the Suspension Clause in 
Boumediene.5  It will also explain the relevant post-Boumediene case 
law, as well as Bivens actions and how detainees attempt to assert 
such actions for money damages against the government.6  These 
actions are significant because if such a Bivens claim is recognized, 
some constitutional protection that has been violated would also have 
to be recognized.7  Part III of this note will examine the facts leading 
up to Hamad’s claim, including his allegations of cruel, inhumane, 
and degrading treatment (CIDT), and his subsequent release without 
any charge.8  Part IV will examine the District Court for the Western 
District of Washington’s decision, which has been noted as the only 
court to hold that a detainee had a Bivens claim.9  Part V will 
examine the Ninth Circuit’s holding that § 2241(e)(2) was not 
overruled in Boumediene, including its application of the severability 
doctrine, as well as the holding that Bivens claims are never 
constitutionally required.10  Part VI will examine the legal and social 
impact of Bivens claims’ denials.11  Finally, I will briefly conclude 
that courts should be more receptive towards acknowledging money 
damages for detainees as a way of protecting Americans from abuses 
by the government.12   
 
 
                                                            
4 See infra Part II. 
5 See id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 See infra Part III. 
9 See infra Part IV. 
10 See infra Part V. 
11 See infra Part VI. 
12 See infra Part VII. 
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II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
A.  September 11th and the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force of 2001 
 
On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda agents hijacked four 
commercial airplanes and attacked the World Trade Center in New 
York City, the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, and crashed the 
fourth airplane into a field in Pennsylvania.13  These attacks resulted 
in the deaths of nearly 3,000 civilians.14  Following the attacks, 
Congress authorized the President to “use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks.”15  Since then, the United States has been in armed conflict 
with the perpetrators of that attack, al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as well 
as other terrorist organizations.16  As opposed to more traditional 
forms of warfare, with uniformed armies of nation-states fighting 
each other, this conflict has been different: Al-Qaeda and similarly 
affiliated groups have a worldwide presence and the ability to 
execute attacks internationally “with a magnitude and sophistication 
never before seen from a non-state actor.”17  Though the United 
States had the authority under both international and domestic law to 
take military actions against al-Qaeda and its supporters,18 the 
                                                            
13 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006). 
14 Id. 
15 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107- 40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
16 Charles A. Allen, Alternatives To Prosecution For War Crimes in the War 
on Terrorism, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121, 122 (2008). 
17 Allen, supra note 16, at 122. 
18 AUMF, supra note 15. The collective self-defense provision of the North 
Atlantic Treaty provided that if an armed attack occurred against one of the parties 
in Europe or North America, the others will exercise the right of individual or 
collective self-defense.  North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 
2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.  In a statement by NATO the day after the September 
11 attack, the North Atlantic Council agreed that if the attack was determined to 
have been directed from abroad, it would be covered by Article 5.  Press Release, 
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position of individuals detained in the course of the conflict was less 
clear. The law of war recognizes the right to detain enemy lawful and 
unlawful combatants until the end of the conflict.19  However, in 
contrast to a traditional war, the current conflict is not one that will 
have a single definite end.20  Detainees captured in the course of the 
conflict therefore potentially an indefinite detention.21   
After October 7, 2001, U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan, and 
captured and detained thousands of individuals that it alleged were 
enemy combatants.22  The next year, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld announced that some of the al-Qaeda and Taliban 
combatants captured in Afghanistan would be detained by the 
Department of Defense (DOD) at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.23  The 
next day, Secretary Rumsfeld alleged that because these detainees 
had fought without uniforms or insignias and had chosen innocent 
civilians as their targets, they were “unlawful enemy combatants 
[who] do not have any rights under the Geneva Convention.”24  At its 
                                                            
North Atlantic Council, Statement by the North Atlantic Council, (2001)124 (Sep. 
15, 2001) http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm. 
19 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (“The capture and detention 
of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, 
by ‘universal agreement and practice,’ are ‘important incident[s] of war”) (citing 
Ex parte Quirin, 63 S.Ct. 2, 28, 30 (1942)) (alteration in original). 
20 Allen, supra note 14, at 122-123. 
21 Id. 
22 Alissa J. Kness, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: An Unconstitutional 
Response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 52 S.D. L. REV. 382, 383 (2007). 
23 Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Department of Defense News 
Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers (Jan. 3, 2002), 
http://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1046.  Secretary 
Rumsfeld said that at that point, the U.S. had 248 detainees in various locations in 
Afghanistan, and that they would begin moving the detainees to Cuba as soon as 
the base was constructed.  Id. 
24 Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Department of Defense News 
Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers (Jan. 11, 2002), 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2031.  Common 
Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 provides that: 
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those place [out of 
combat] by . . . detention . . . shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely. . . .  To this end the following acts are and shall remain 
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the 
above mentioned persons: 
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height, Guantanamo housed over 770 such detainees, but of those, 
only ten received formal charges for crimes.25  Many observers 
questioned the combatant status of the detainees because the majority 
were turned over by militias and civilians in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan in return for substantial bounties offered in exchange for al-
Qaeda or Taliban forces.26 
 
B.  Hamdi, Rasul and the Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
 
 Before 2004, no systematic effort had been made by the DOD or 
the military to determine if the detainees held at Guantanamo were 
combatants, in which case the Geneva protections27 applied, or 
unlawful non-combatants not entitled to such protections.28  In 
November 2001, President George W. Bush issued an Executive 
Order stating that he intended to detain and try individuals captured 
                                                            
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
 (b) taking of hostages; 
 (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and 
degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of 
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
25 Michael Greenberger, You Ain’t Seen Nothin’ Yet: The Inevitable Post-
Hamdan Conflict Between the Supreme Court and the Political Branches, 66 MD. 
L. REV. 805, 816 (2007). 
26 Id. at 816-17.  Many commentators have speculated that “the financial 
incentives for capture overwhelmed the true non-combatant nature of those 
detained.”  Id.  The military offered cash bounties as high as $5,000 for any Taliban 
member and up to $20,000 for any member of al-Qaeda.  Kness, supra note 22, at 
383. “In fact, 86 [percent] of the detainees captured . . . were handed over to the 
United States at a time in which the United States offered large bounties for the 
capture of suspected enemies.”  Id. (quoting Mark Denbeaux, Joshua Denbeaux & 
Seton Hall Students, Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees 
Through Analysis of Department of Defense Data (Feb. 6, 2006) http:// 
law.shu.edu/news/Guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf.). 
27 See Geneva Convention art. 3, supra note 24. 
28 Greenberger, supra note 25, at 818.   
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in Afghanistan and elsewhere in military tribunals.29 The President 
would “from time to time” determine whom would be subject to the 
order (and not whether the person was a combatant), however, no 
process was created for detainees to object to their detention.30  The 
“bare-bones” Executive Order, and the DOD’s attempts to implement 
it, were sharply criticized by the American Bar Association.31  
Additionally, the abuses the detainees suffered as well as the harsh 
interrogation practices at Guantanamo received worldwide 
condemnation.32  Importantly, the detainees had no access to legal 
counsel, nor any way to address the reason for their detention.   
In 2004, the Supreme Court issued two momentous decisions.  In 
Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that federal courts have jurisdiction 
over “challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals 
captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at . . . 
                                                            
29 Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 16, 
2001). 
30 Id. at 57834.  See also Greenberger, supra note 25, at 817 (stating that the 
Afghanistan conflict was “the first conflict since the advent of the Geneva 
Conventions in 1949 where the United States military did not convene battlefield 
tribunals to determine whether those captured were properly classified as 
combatants or prisoners of war or were innocent civilians”). 
31 Letter from Karen J. Mathis, President, American Bar Association, to MG 
John D. Altenburg, Jr. USA (Ret.), Appointing Authority, Office of Military 
Commissions (Oct. 20, 2006) 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/letters/antiterror/061
020letter_milcom_dod.authcheckdam.pdf.  The lack of instruction on how to 
proceed with the commission meant that the DOD was “repeatedly forced to revise 
the military commission structure,” publishing “two separate military orders and 
ten military commission instructions outlining practices and procedures.”  
Greenberger, supra note 25, at 822.  
32 See, e.g., Foreign Affairs Committee, Visit to Guantanamo Bay, 2006-7, 
H.C. 44-2, at 37, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmfaff/44/44.pdf 
(recommending that Guantanamo be closed as soon as a process could be found to 
deal with the detainees in consideration of the “overriding need to protect the 
public from terrorist threats”), Alix Kroeger, Euro MPs Urge Guantanamo 
Closure, BBC NEWS (June 13, 2006) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5074216.stm. (The European Parliament called 
Guantanamo “an anomaly,” and voted “overwhelmingly in favour of a motion 
calling on the US to close the Guantanamo Bay detention camp.”) 
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Guantanamo Bay.”33  This was the first time the Court recognized 
that Guantanamo Bay detainees could appeal to federal courts with a 
writ of habeas corpus to challenge their confinement.34  The Court in 
Rasul specifically pointed to the power to grant writ under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241.35 
 Two days later, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld the Court held that a 
United States citizen held at Guantanamo Bay had Due Process 
rights: a “meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that 
detention before a neutral decision-maker.”36  Though the Court 
recognized the argument that requiring such a process might subject 
military officers to the “threat of litigation,” the Court dismissed such 
concerns because the disputes would be “limited to the alleged 
combatant’s acts.”  The Court further reasoned that the separation of 
powers doctrines did not give a “blank check for the President” to 
override constitutional rights or the “constitutionally mandated roles 
of reviewing and resolving claims” by federal courts.37  Even during 
times of war, the Court elaborated, the Constitution “most assuredly 
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at 
stake.”38  However, the Court provided little explanation of the 
contours of the due process hearing, and left the definition of the 
legal category of enemy combatant for the lower courts.39 
After the decision in Hamdi, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
established the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs).40  The 
purpose of the CSRTs was “to determine whether individuals 
detained at Guantanamo were ‘enemy combatants’ . . . .”41  The 
CSRTs were to comply with the due process requirements set out by 
                                                            
33 542 U.S. at 470 (2004). 
34 Joseph Landau, Article, Muscular Procedure:  Conditional Deference in the 
Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV 661 (2009). 
35 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004). 
36 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004). 
37 Id. at 535-36. 
38 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536. 
39 Id. at 522, n.1.  See also Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the 
“War on Terror”, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1048 (2008) (noting that the majority 
in Hamdi could not agree on what the procedures for the hearing would be). 
40 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008). 
41 Id. 
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the Court in Hamdi.42  These commissions were to have two parts: 
(1) a hearing by the CSRT to determine the status of a detainee, and 
if they were deemed an “enemy combatant,” then (2) the detainee 
would be eligible for trial by a military commission.43  “An enemy 
combatant” was defined as “. . . an individual who was part of or 
supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are 
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners.” 44  The detainee would be represented by a “personal 
representative” and could call any witnesses, but were restricted from 
viewing classified evidence “even if it explained ‘how, where and 
from whom the information about the accusations supporting the 
enemy combatant charge originated.’”45   
 
C. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006 
 
In response to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rasul and 
Hamdi, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
(DTA).46  The DTA amended 28 U.S.C § 2241 by adding the new 
section (e) to it.  The DTA stripped jurisdiction from any “court, 
justice, or judge” to hear (1) applications for writs of habeas corpus 
filed by aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay and (2) “any other action 
against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the 
detention . . . .”47  The DTA also vested exclusive review of the 
CSRTs’ determination in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.48  
Additionally, the DTA contained an “effective date” provision: 
 
(1) IN GENERAL.—This section shall take effect on 
the date of the enactment of this Act. 
(2) REVIEW OF COMBATANT STATUS 
TRIBUNAL AND MILITARY COMMISSION 
                                                            
42 Id. 
43 Kness, supra note 22, at 396-97.    
44 Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F.Supp.2d 133, 135 (2008). 
45 Kness, supra note 22, at 397. 
46 Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005, PL 109-148, 119 Stat 2680 (2005). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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DECISIONS.—Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection 
(e) shall apply with respect to any claim whose review 
is governed by one of such paragraphs and that is 
pending on or after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.49 
 
The DTA “place[d] restrictions on the treatment and interrogation 
of detainees in U.S. custody,” as well as established protections for 
U.S. citizens who have been accused of mistreatment.50  It also 
required the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to Congress on 
the procedures that the CSRTs, and the Administrative Review 
Boards (ARBs), would follow for determining the status of 
detainees.51  
The Supreme Court countered Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping 
provisions in the DTA when it decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.52  In 
Hamdan, the Court did not expressly overrule the DTA.53  Instead, 
the Court concluded that the effective date provision of the DTA did 
not expressly apply to pending habeas corpus petitions, only future 
petitions.54  Therefore, the Court held that such pending habeas 
actions as Hamdan’s could continue.55 
 
D. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and Boumediene v. 
Bush 
 
In Hamdan, the Supreme Court’s decision had not reached the 
constitutional rights available to alien detainees of the government.56  
Justice Breyer’s separate concurrence, joined by Justices Kennedy, 
Souter, and Ginsburg, noted that Hamdan was not the last say on the 
issue of how the government should treat the alien detainees.57  
                                                            
49 Id. 
50 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 572 (2006). 
51119 Stat 2680, see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 572.  
52 548 U.S. at 557. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 576-585. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006).(Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Justice Breyer noted that “[n]othing prevents the President from 
returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”58 
 In fact, President Bush did return to Congress for the necessary 
authority, signing into law the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
(MCA) on October 17, 2006.59  Section 7(a) of the MCA retained 
much of the same language as the DTA, amending § 2241 by adding 
in a section (e) that eliminated jurisdiction from any court to hear (1) 
“an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an 
alien detained by the United States . . . ” and (2) “any other action 
against the United States relating to any aspect of the detention, 
transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien 
who is or was detained by the United States . . . .”60  Congress’s 
intent in enacting the MCA was broad.  While the DTA only affected 
statutory habeas corpus jurisdiction, the MCA was meant to also 
include the constitutional writ.61 
The MCA was viewed by many as a “harsh rebuke” of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan.62  Unlike in the DTA, the 
extent to which habeas corpus should apply to the detainees was 
                                                            
58 Id.  
59 Greenberg, supra note 25, at 811. 
60 Military Commissions Act of 2006, PL 109-366, 120 Stat 2600 (October 17, 
2006).  In full, the MCA provides: 
(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to 
hear or consider an application for a writ of  habeas corpus filed 
by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has 
been determined by  the United States to have been properly 
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such 
determination. 
 
(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 
1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005  (10 U.S.C. 801 
note), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or 
consider any other action  against the United States or its agents 
relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or 
 conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by 
the United States and has been determined  by the United States 
to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is 
awaiting such  determination. Id. 
 
61 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 2242. 
62 Greenberger, supra note 25, at 812. 
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debated thoroughly by Congress when it considered the MCA.63  The 
habeas bar of the MCA was only the fifth time in the history of the 
United States that the writ had been suspended.64 
The passage of the MCA met with immediate criticism from 
multiple commentators.65  First, the MCA broadened the personal 
jurisdiction of the military commissions to include any alien who was 
“part of” the “associated forces” of terrorist organizations, even if 
they had not actively engaged in hostilities against United States 
forces.66  Also, though the MCA prohibited evidence that was 
obtained through torture after December 30, 2005, there was no 
prohibition against evidence obtained before that date.67  Even then, 
the MCA provided military commission judges great latitude in 
admitting statements coerced through cruel, inhumane, or degrading 
treatment.68 
The MCA’s harsh jurisdiction-stripping provisions prevented the 
alien detainees from challenging their detention, even where the 
detainees had no other legal recourse.69  Senator John McCain 
decried the fact that the MCA “stripped those detainees of any other 
recourse to the U.S. courts for legal actions regarding their detention 
                                                            
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 See, e.g. Norman Abrams, Developments in US Anti-Terrorism Law, 4 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1117, 1135 (2006); Greenberger, supra note 25, at 812-816; 
Kness, supra note 22, 
66 Greenberger, supra note 25, at 812 (citing 120 Stat. at 2601, § 3). 
67 Id. See also 152 CONG. REC. S10243-01. 
68 Id. Military judges could admit such statements depending on when the 
statements were made: 
Coerced statements elicited prior to the DTA's prohibition of “cruel, inhumane, 
or degrading” interrogations are admissible only if the military judge should 
conclude that “the totality of the circumstances renders the [coerced] statement 
reliable and possessing sufficient probative value” and “the interests of justice 
would best be served by admissi[bility].” Statements coerced after passage of the 
DTA's McCain Amendment are admissible if the two standards articulated above 
are met and “the interrogation methods . . . do not amount to cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment” prohibited, inter alia, by the Eighth Amendment. Thus, by 
legislative legerdemain, the protections within the much-lauded McCain 
Amendment are redefined merely to prevent conduct violating the quite limited 
reach of the Eighth Amendment. Greenberger, supra note 25, at 814 (internal 
citations omitted). 
69 152 CONG. REC. S10243-01. 
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or treatment in U.S. custody.”70  The broad, sweeping language of the 
MCA eliminated  
. . . all other legal rights . . . for . . . aliens, including lawful 
permanent residents detained inside or outside the United States who 
have been determined by the United States to be the enem[y]. The 
only requirement . . . is that the [United States] determine[] that the 
alien detainee is an enemy combatant, but the bill provides no 
standard for this determination and offers the detainee no ability to 
challenge it. Consequently, even aliens who have been released from 
U.S. custody . . . would be denied any legal recourse as long as the 
United States continues to claim that they were properly held.71 
 Initially, it was unclear whether the federal courts would find the 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the MCA unconstitutional.  In 
Hamad, the Supreme Court did not have to address the 
constitutionality of a similar measure in the DTA because the Court 
did not find that the DTA stripped it of jurisdiction.72  In December 
of 2006, the D.C. District Court decided the remanded case of 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.73  There, the District Court held that the MCA 
effectively stripped jurisdiction from the federal courts.  But, it was 
not unconstitutional, and Hamdan had no access to the writ of habeas 
corpus.74  Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s efforts, through Hamdi, 
Rasul, and Hamdan, to give the protections of the rule of law to 
detainees, the fact that no court had fully addressed what 
constitutional protections apply to the detainees meant that the 
detainees still lacked the ability to contest their detention. 
 In 2008, the Supreme Court conclusively established that aliens 
detained at Guantanamo had the right to petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in order to challenge their detention.75  The petitioners in 
Boumediene were aliens who had been captured in Afghanistan and 
                                                            
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 “[S]ubsections (e)(2) and (e)(3) [of DTA § 1005] grant jurisdiction only 
over actions to ‘determine the validity of any final decision’ of a CSRT or 
commission.  Because Hamdan . . . is not contesting any ‘final decision’ of a CSRT 
or military commission, his action does not fall within the scope of subsection 
(e)(2) or (e)(3).” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 583 (2006). 
73 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006). 
74 Id. 
75 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008). 
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elsewhere, had been designated as “enemy combatants” by the 
CSRTs, and were detained at Guantanamo Bay.76  The petitioners 
had applied to the District Court for the District of Columbia for a 
writ of habeas corpus.77  Using similar reasoning that it applied in the 
remanded Hamdan case,78 the D.C. Court of Appeals held that MCA 
§ 7 stripped jurisdiction for any federal court to hear their habeas 
petitions, that it was not unconstitutional, and the petitioners had no 
right to apply for the writ.79 
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the 
decision of the D.C. Court of Appeals, and held that Guantanamo 
detainees do have the habeas corpus privilege.80  First, however, the 
Supreme Court had to decide whether MCA § 7 denied them 
jurisdiction to hear the case at all.81  Unlike the DTA in Hamdan,82 
the MCA left “little doubt that the effective date provision applies to 
habeas corpus actions.”83  However, the petitioners argued that:  
Section 2241(e)(1) refers to “a writ of habeas corpus.” The next 
paragraph, § 2241(e)(2), refers to “any other action . . . relating to 
any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of 
confinement of an alien who ... [has] been properly detained as an 
enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.” There are two 
separate paragraphs . . . so there must be two distinct classes of cases. 
And the effective date subsection, MCA § 7(b) . . . refers only to the 
second class of cases, for it largely repeats the language of § 
2241(e)(2) by referring to “cases . . . which relate to any aspect of the 
detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an 
alien detained by the United States.”84 
The Court rejected this argument, pointing to the fact that the 
phrase “other action” in § 2241(e)(2) can only be understood in 
reference to § 2241(e)(1), which mentions “writ of habeas corpus.”85  
                                                            
76 Id. at 734. 
77 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723. 
78 See Hamdan, 464 F.Supp.2d at 9. 
79 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 724. 
80 Id. at 733. 
81 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 736 (2008). 
82 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576-85 (2006). 
83 Boumediene, 553 U.S.at 737. 
84 Id. at 738. 
85 Id. at 737.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)–(2). 
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Even though the effective date provision of MCA § 7(b) appeared to 
have the same language as § 2241(e)(2),86 the Court held that habeas 
actions are a type of action that the structure of the two paragraphs 
implies is covered by the effective date provision.87  Pending habeas 
actions are therefore covered by § 2241(e)(1); so long as MCA § 7 
was constitutionally valid, the petitioner’s claims would have to be 
dismissed.88 The Court thus faced two issues: (1) did the 
Guantanamo detainees have constitutional rights, and if so, (2) did 
the MCA and DTA provide adequate alternative procedures (through 
the CSRTs) to the writ of habeas corpus?89 
 Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy held that the 
detainees are protected by the constitutional privilege of habeas 
corpus, and that the CSRTs provided an inadequate substitute for the 
writ.90  Justice Kennedy explained that the writ of habeas corpus 
through the Suspension Clause91 was meant to protect against the 
“cyclical abuses” of the Executive and the Legislative branches.92  
According to Justice Kennedy, the Suspension Clause was uniquely 
important as a tool for the Judiciary to use to enforce the separation-
of-powers doctrine.93  Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on the separation-
of-powers seemed to guide much of his analysis.94  Thus, Justice 
Kennedy rejected the Government’s argument that the “political 
question doctrine” required the Court to allow the political branches 
to limit habeas corpus jurisdiction based on de jure sovereignty.95  
Justice Kennedy emphasized that the Constitution does not grant the 
                                                            
86 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2), and Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 
7(b). 
87 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 737 (2008). 
88 Id. 
89 Joshua Alexander Geltzer, Of Suspension, Due Process, and Guantanamo: 
The Reach of the Fifth Amendment After Boumediene and the Relationship 
Between Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 719, 725 (2012). 
90 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33.  
91 Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the 
Suspension Clause, provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety may require it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
92 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745. 
93 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745-46 (2008).. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
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political branches “the power to decide when and where its terms 
apply,” and that the Government is still constrained by the 
restrictions of the Constitution.96  The wider reasoning behind 
Boumediene, then, was to defend the reach of the judiciary: “To hold 
[that] the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution 
on or off at will is . . . a striking anomaly . . . leading to a regime in 
which Congress and the President, not this Court, say ‘what the law 
is.’”97  However, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the decision by 
the Court was a narrow one: 
Our decision today holds only that petitioners 
before us are entitled to seek the writ; that the DTA 
review procedures are an inadequate substitute for 
habeas corpus; and that petitioners in these cases need 
not exhaust the review procedures in the Court of 
Appeals before proceeding with their habeas actions 
in the District Court.98 
The majority in Boumediene expressly declined to decide whether 
the CSRT procedures satisfied due process requirements.99  Indeed, 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the dissent in Boumediene, sharply 
criticized the majority for extending the Suspension Clause without 
engaging in any due process analysis.100 
 
E. Money Damages Claims By Detainees After Boumediene 
 
After the Supreme Court extended legal rights to detainees 
through the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, many 
commentators believed that other parts of the Constitution would be 
extended to Guantanamo.101  To many commentators, the most likely 
constitutional right that would next be extended would be the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.102  The Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived 
                                                            
96 Id. at 765. 
97 Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)). 
98 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795. 
99 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008). 
100 Id. at 801–02 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
101 See, e.g., Geltzer, supra note 89, at 720. 
102 Id. 
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of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”103  If the 
Due Process Clause was found to apply to Guantanamo detainees, 
then it would allow alien detainees to be able to pursue claims based 
on violations of the Fifth Amendment.  More specifically, this would 
allow former Guantanamo detainees to pursue civil lawsuits for 
compensation in suits known as Bivens actions. 
 
1.  Bivens Actions And The “Special Factors Counseling Hesitation” 
 
 A Bivens action is a civil suit where the claimant alleges 
constitutional violations by federal agents, and is named after the 
case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.104  In Bivens, agents from 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics conducted a search of Bivens’ 
apartment without a warrant or probable cause and recovered 
narcotics.105  Bivens sued the agents, alleging that they had violated 
his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.106  The 
Supreme Court reasoned that while there is no specific provision in 
the Fourth Amendment (or in the Constitution) that provides for 
money damages for violations of it, “federal courts may use any 
available remedy to make good the wrong done.”107  Therefore, the 
Court held that where a constitutional right has been violated by 
federal agents, that person is entitled to recover money damages.108   
In what would later become a limiting doctrine to Bivens claims, 
the Court noted several “special factors counseling hesitation in the 
absence of affirmative action by Congress.”109  The Court listed three 
special factors that were areas that were traditionally reserved to 
congressional judgment: federal fiscal policy, government-soldier 
relationship, and congressional employment.110  The “special factors” 
evolved from factors that counseled hesitancy, into a nonjusticiability 
doctrine that courts could use to deny a Bivens remedy, especially 
                                                            
103 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
104 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
105 Id. at 389–90. 
106 Id. at 390. 
107 Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 
108 Id. 
109 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
110 Id. 
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where a Bivens remedy “might compete with Congress’s statutory 
decisions.”111  For example, the Supreme Court refused to infer 
Bivens remedies for claims of employment discrimination in 
violation of the First Amendment,112  Social Security disability 
benefits terminated in violation of the Fifth Amendment,113 and 
injuries arising from secret testing of LSD on an officer in the 
military in violation of tort law.114   
Generally, the “special factors” were considered and used to bar a 
judicial remedy where Congress had created a statutory remedy for 
specific constitutional violations.  However, Wilkie v. Robbins 
expanded the “special factors” to include areas where Congress had 
not created an express remedial scheme.115  In Wilkie, the Court 
refused to create a Bivens remedy where Government employees 
harassed, intimidated, and trespassed onto Robbins’ property in an 
effort to obtain an easement over his land.116  The Court reasoned 
that, even though no federal remedy existed, “Robbins had . . . a wide 
variety of [state] administrative and judicial remedies to redress his 
injuries.”117  Fearful of “an onslaught of Bivens actions,” the Court 
signaled its intent to limit future Bivens actions and instead, defer to 
Congress’s legislative judgment to provide or not provide a 
remedy.118 
 
2.  Bivens Actions By Guantanamo Detainees 
 
In general, most courts have attempted to avoid the issue of 
whether the detainees have any right to pursue a damages claim 
                                                            
111 Ian Samson, Boumediene as a Constitutional Mandate: Bivens Actions at 
Guantanamo Bay, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 439, 453 (2011). 
112 Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983). 
113 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 (1988). 
114 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681–84 (1987). 
115 551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
116 Id. at 541. 
117 Id. at 562. 
118 Id.  See also Samson, supra note 111, at 454. 
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based on alleged constitutional violations.119 The D.C. Circuit has 
held that the Due Process Clause does not apply to alien detainees, 
and that Boumediene was limited to the Suspension Clause.120 In 
Rasul v. Myers, also known as Rasul II, the D.C. Circuit held that 
Boumediene only invalidated the portion of the MCA that deprived 
federal court of habeas corpus jurisdiction, and retained the other 
portions, which restricted the detainee’s judicial access.121  In Rasul 
II, four British nationals brought an action asserting, among other 
claims, Bivens claims for violations of the Fifth and Eighth 
Amendments.122  They argued that Boumediene created a “functional 
test” that entitled detainees to “fundamental constitutional rights” 
unless it was “impracticable and anomalous” to recognize those 
rights.123  They further argued that the rights they sought were 
constitutional, and it would not be “impracticable and anomalous” to 
recognize them.124  However, the D.C. Circuit skirted the issue, 
noting the narrow holding of Boumediene: “the Court stressed that its 
decision ‘does not address the content of the law that governs 
petitioners’ detention.’”125  The Rasul II court interpreted that 
statement to mean “Boumediene disclaimed any intention to disturb 
existing law governing the extraterritorial reach of any constitutional 
provisions, other than the Suspension Clause.”126  Despite this, the 
                                                            
119 Geltzer notes that, wherever possible, the D.C. Circuit has declined to 
address the issue of whether the Due Process, or any other constitutional 
protections, apply to the detainees. Geltzer, supra note 89, at 740–43. 
120 See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir 2009), vacated, 559 
U.S. 131 (2010), reinstated by 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir 2010).  For a complete 
discussion of the Kiyemba case, see Geltzer, supra note 89 at 740–43. 
121 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
122 Id. at 528. 
123 Supplemental Brief on Remand of Appellants/Cross Appellees Rasul, et al., 
Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 06-5209, 06-5222), 2009 WL 
700174 (C.A.D.C.) at *1. 
124 Id. 
125 Rasul, 563 F.3d. at 529 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 
(2008)).  Samson noted that the Rasul II court ignored the following sentence, 
which stated that the issue of what constitutional provisions apply “is a matter yet 
to be determined.” Samson, supra note 111, at 459 (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. 
at 797).  
126 Rasul, 563 F.3d at 529. 
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D.C. Circuit did not rule on whether any constitutional provisions 
applied to the detainees.127  Instead, the court dismissed the Bivens 
claims based on qualified immunity.128  Rasul II thus stood as the 
“definitive opinion on Boumediene in the D.C. Circuit,” interpreting 
Boumediene to provide no constitutional rights to be violated for a 
Bivens claim.129 
 
3.  The Blueprint For The Ninth Circuit: Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez 
 
In 2012, the D.C. Circuit took the analysis that had begun in 
Rasul II to its full conclusion in Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, and held 
that Boumediene did not overrule 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2).130   Al-
Zahrani was an action brought by the representatives of Yasser Al-
Zahrani and Salah Ali Abdullah, citizens of Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen, respectively, who were detained at Guantanamo.131  The two 
had died at Guantanamo under disputed circumstances.132  Their 
representatives sought money damages in a Bivens action, alleging 
violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, among other 
claims.133  Relying on the D.C. Circuit’s prior decision in Rasul II, 
the D.C. District Court did not reach the constitutionality of the 
MCA, and instead dismissed the Bivens claims based on qualified 
immunity.134  However, as opposed to the earlier decision in Rasul II, 
the D.C. Circuit chose to directly address whether the provisions of 
the MCA, which purported to strip jurisdiction from federal courts 
for non-habeas actions, survived Boumediene.135  First, the D.C. 
                                                            
127Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009).. “[W]e should not decide 
whether Boumediene portends application of the Due Process Clause and Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause to Guantanamo detainees.”Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Samson, supra note 111, at 457. 
130 Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315, 320 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
131 Id. at 317. 
132 Josh White, Guards’ Lapses Cited in Detainee Suicides, THE WASHINGTON 
POST (Aug. 23, 2008) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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133 Al-Zahrani, 669 F.3d at 318. 
134 Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F.Supp.2d 103, 110-13 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 
135 See supra, Part II, section E, subsection b, for a discussion of Rasul II. 
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Circuit noted that Boumediene was an appeal from their own court, 
involving “a decision applying the first subsection of § 7 governing 
and barring the hearing of applications for writs of habeas corpus 
filed by detained aliens.”136  Applying similar logic as it had applied 
in Rasul II, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that much of the Supreme 
Court’s decision focused on the Suspension Clause.137  Additionally, 
the D.C. Circuit argued that § 2241(e)(2) governed the case, and had 
“no effect on habeas jurisdiction.”138  The D.C. Circuit also rejected 
the argument that § 2241(e)(2) unconstitutionally barred remedies for 
violations of constitutional rights.139   
Significantly, the court asserted that money remedies “are not 
constitutionally required.”140  Utilizing the “special factors” 
analysis,141 the court chose not to extend a Bivens remedy to the 
detainees.142  Therefore, the court said, “the Supreme Court used a 
scalpel and not a bludgeon,” and thus § 2241(e)(2) continued to have 
effect.143 
 
III.  FACTS 
 
In 2002, Adel Hassan Hamad, appellant, a resident and citizen of 
Sudan,144 was captured in Pakistan by Pakistani security forces 
“acting under the direction of an ‘unknown American official.’”145  
Hamad claims he was a humanitarian aid worker for the World 
Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY),146 a Saudi Arabian-funded 
                                                            





141 See supra, Part II, section E, subsection b. 
142 Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315, 320 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
143 Id. 
144 Notice of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
and Improper Venue, or, in the Alternative, for Transfer, and Memorandum of 
Points and Authority in Support Thereof. 
145 Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 
146 Andy Worthington, The Shocking Stories of the Sudanese Humanitarian 
Aid Workers Just Released From Guantanamo, ANDY WORTHINGTON (Dec. 7, 
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organization that has been accused of being “a discreet channel for . . 
. donations to hardline Islamic organisations.”147  Hamad was 
transferred by the Pakistani security forces to the U.S. military, 
which detained him first at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, then at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.148  He claims that while he was detained, he 
“was subjected to prolonged arbitrary detention, cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment . . . [and] torture.”149   
In March 2005, a divided Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
(CSRT) determined that Hamad was an “enemy combatant.”150  In 
November 2005, an Administrative Review Board (ARB) panel 
reviewed the detention of Hamad and determined that while he 
continued to be “a threat to the United States and its allies,” he was 
eligible to be transferred to Sudan.151  However, he only received 
notice that he was eligible in February 2007.152  After obtaining an 
agreement with Sudan as to the conditions of his transfer,153 in 
December 2007, Hamad was transferred to Sudan.154  He was never 
charged with any crime at any point in his detention.155 
After his release, in 2010, Hamad filed a claim in federal court 
for money damages against twenty-two named military and civilian 
government officials, including former Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates, and 100 other unnamed officials.156  He alleges that these 
officials were acting outside the scope of their employment and in 
                                                            
2014), http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2007/12/14/the-shocking-stories-of-the-
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147 Greg Palast & David Pallister, FBI Claims Bin Laden Inquiry Was 
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their individual capacities.157  Hamad raised six claims under state 
common law, the Alien Tort Statute,158 international law, and the 
Geneva Conventions.159  His six claims were for (1) prolonged 
arbitrary detention; (2) cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; (3) 
torture; (4) targeting of a civilian; (5) violation of due process; and 
(6) forced disappearance.160  In addition, Hamad’s second amended 
complaint alleged a seventh claim for damages for violation of due 
process under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.161  His claims were based on his alleged wrongful 
detention, torture, and mistreatment during his initial detention in 
Pakistan and at Bagram Airfield, as well as during his transportation 
to and detention at Guantanamo Bay.162  Hamad sought a judgment 
for compensatory damages, exemplary and punitive damages, and 
attorneys’ fees from the defendants.163 
 
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Hamad filed his action in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Washington.164  The district court dismissed all 
other defendants except for Defense Secretary Gates for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.165 The district court also granted the 
government’s motion to substitute itself for Gates for the first six 
claims under the Westfall Act.166   
                                                            
157 Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2013). 
158 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
159 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for Damages Hamad, 732 F.3d 990 
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at *7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2012) vacated and remanded, 732 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 
2013) 
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[u]pon certification . . . that the defendant 
employee was acting within the scope of his 
office . . . at the time of the incident out of 
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First, the District Court addressed whether Gates was protected 
by the qualified immunity doctrine.167  The government argued that 
Gates was protected by qualified immunity168 because, at the time 
Hamad was detained, there was a “‘lack of case law’ establishing the 
Due Process rights of Guantanamo detainees.”169  The District Court 
rejected this argument, finding that a “reasonable federal official 
would know that detaining a person, after determining he is eligible 
for release, violates a clearly established constitutional right.”170  
Additionally, the District Court found that Boumediene struck down 
§ 2241(e) in its entirety–both the section that “strip[ped] federal 
jurisdiction over habeas petitions [subsection (e)(1)] and the 
subsection that stripped federal jurisdiction over Bivens actions 
[subsection (e)(2)].”171  Therefore, the District Court reasoned, 
Boumediene recognized that full constitutional protections extend to 
Guantanamo detainees. 
 However, the District Court agreed with the government’s second 
argument that Hamad failed to allege in his complaint that Gates was 
“personally involved in violating Hamad’s constitutional rights.”172  
The District Court rejected Hamad’s four factual allegations as 
“weak” and “not enough to meet Iqbal’s plausibility standard.”173  
                                                            
which the claim arose, any civil action or 
proceeding commenced upon such claim in a 
United States district court shall be deemed an 
action against the United States . . . and the 
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167 Hamad, 2012 WL 1253167, at *2. 
168 “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from 
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established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.’” Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)).  For a 
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169 Id. at *3. 
170 Id. at *5. 
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The District Court held that while it was “possible Gates knew 
Hamad was unlawfully detained,” it was not plausible.  Therefore, 
the District Court rejected Hamad’s last claim and dismissed it.174 
 
V.  ANALYSIS OF OPINION 
 
The Ninth Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) deprived the 
court of subject- matter jurisdiction to hear Hamad’s claims.175  First, 
it considered whether the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush had 
struck down all of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 2241(e), 
and it held that it did not.176  Next, the court then concluded that 
(e)(2) was severable from (e)(1).177  Finally, the court held that § 
2241(e)(2) was constitutional as applied to Hamad.178 
 
A.  Did Boumediene Strike Down All of § 2241(e)? 
 
The court first addressed whether the District Court had subject-
matter jurisdiction over Hamad’s claim, despite the jurisdiction-
stripping provisions of § 2241(e).  The court outlined the five 
requirements that § 2241(e)(2) sets for a federal court to lack 
jurisdiction over an action: 
(1) the action is “against the United States or its agents”;  
(2) the action relates to “any aspect of the detention, transfer, 
treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or 
was detained by the United States”;  
(3) the action relates to an alien who was “determined by the 
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant 
or is [an alien] awaiting such a determination”;  
(4) the action is an action “other” than an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus . . . and  
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(5) the action does not qualify for an exception under § 
1005(e)(2) or (3) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005(DTA)179, 
which provide the D.C. Circuit jurisdiction over a narrow class of 
challenges by enemy combatants.180 
Looking at the five requirements, the court held that Hamad’s 
action met each of them.181 Since § 2241(e)(2) “applie[d] by its 
terms,”182 the court next considered whether Boumediene struck 
down all of § 2241, or only referred to the subdivision stripping 
jurisdiction over habeas corpus actions.183  First, the court reviewed 
the historical backdrop of Supreme Court precedent, Congressional 
legislation, and Presidential actions which lead to Hamad’s 
argument.184  The court noted that because Boumediene’s holding 
focused primarily on Congress’s authority to suspend habeas corpus 
at Guantanamo Bay, it did not analyze the constitutionality of § 
2241(e)(2).185  Additionally, Boumediene did not address whether 
any other constitutional provisions applied to Guantanamo 
detainees.186  Hamad argued that because the Supreme Court did not 
expressly differentiate between § 2241(e)(1) and (2), Boumediene 
should be read to strike down all of § 2241(e).187  However, the Ninth 
Circuit disagreed, stating that the “logic and context of the opinion 
make clear that the Supreme Court was addressing only § 
2241(e)(1).”188  The Supreme Court’s rationale in invalidating § 
2241(e), according to the Ninth Circuit, was that the section deprived 
the detainees of habeas corpus review which unconstitutionally 
violated the Suspension Clause.189  This rationale has no relation to 
subsection (e)(2), which relates to any other action other than habeas 
                                                            
179 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 
Stat. 2680, 2742 (2005).  
180  
181 Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2013). 
182 Id. at 996. 
183 Id.  
184 Id. 
185 Hamad, 732 F.3d at 999. 
186 Id. 
187 Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2013). 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
    
Fall 2015 Hamad v. Gates  469 
corpus.190  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit cited specific language in 
Boumediene that limited the decision to the suspension of the writ of 
habeas.191  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the decision in 
Boumediene could not have struck § 2241(e)(2) down.192 
 
B.  Is § 2241(e)(2) Severable From § 2241(e)(1)? 
 
Next, the court considered whether § 2241(e)(2) was severable 
from § 2241(e)(1).  
Hamad argued in his brief that Sections 2241(e)(1) and (e)(2) are 
textually interdependent, and that (e)(2) cannot stand alone.193  He 
pointed to language in Boumediene which he argued demonstrated 
that the Court “understood the distinction between (e)(1) and (e)(2), 
but chose to strike both sections down as unconstitutional.”194  
Additionally, Hamad argued that if Section 2241(e)(2) were left 
standing, but (e)(1) were removed, the phrase “other action” would 
refer to a non-existing paragraph and it would still preclude habeas 
corpus actions.195  The court rejected these arguments.196  First, the 
court noted that generally, courts should not invalidate more of a 
statute than necessary because “‘[a] ruling of unconstitutionality 
frustrates the intent of the elected representatives.’”197  Citing 
Supreme Court precedent, the presumption when a statute is ruled 
unconstitutional is that the enactment is severable from the rest of the 
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statute.198  The court outlined the three-part Booker severability test, 
and then applied it to Section 2241.199  The severability test, as 
outlined in Booker, requires courts to retain portions of statutes that 
are “(1) constitutionally valid, (2) capable of functioning 
independently, and (3) consistent with Congress’ basic objectives in 
enacting the statute.”200 
 Beginning with the second inquiry of the Booker test, which 
views whether the statute could function independently, the court 
believed that the two provisions of § 2241(e) are capable of 
functioning independently.201  The Ninth Circuit focused on the fact 
that the statute focused on two separate categories of actions that 
Guantanamo detainees could bring.202  According to the Ninth 
Circuit, it was “apparent” that Boumediene’s conclusion only 
addressed habeas actions, and so nothing prevented § 2241(e)(2) 
from independently barring non-habeas action.203 
 The court then addressed Hamad’s argument that the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of § 7(a) and (b) of the MCA shows that § 
2241(e)(2) cannot function independently from § 2241(e)(1).  In 
Boumediene, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s argument 
that § 7(b) of the MCA applied only to non-habeas actions, reasoning 
that the phrase “any other action” in § 2241(e)(2) must be read in 
reference to § 2241(e)(1).204  Hamad argued that because the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning shows that § 2241(e)(2) must be read in 
reference to § 2241(e)(1), and therefore cannot function 
independently.205  The court disagreed, noting that a subsection of a 
statute is still able to function even if it can only be understood by 
referencing an inoperative part of the statute.206  Therefore, the court 
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held that § 2241(e)(2) was fully operative because it bars jurisdiction 
over the subset of cases not covered by § 2241(e)(1).207 
 The court then addressed the third prong of Booker, which is 
whether the retained portion of the statute is consistent with 
Congress’s basic objectives in enacting the statute.208  Again, the 
court referred to the statute itself to show that Congress had two 
concerns: one was “to bar alien detainees from applying for habeas 
corpus,” and the other was to prevent alien detainees from bringing 
any other type of action related to their detention or treatment.209  
The court then reasoned that, based on the history of Congress’s 
responses to Supreme Court decisions210, Congress’s basic objective 
“was to limit detainee’s access to the courts.”211  After briefly 
reviewing the Supreme Court decisions and Congress’s responses to 
each,212 the court concluded that § 2241(e)(2) was consistent with 
Congress’s objective.213  Finally, the court rejected Hamad’s 
argument that the absence of a severability clause meant that 
Congress did not intend the provisions to be severable.214  Citing 
Alaska Airlines,215 the court stated that it was “evident” that the two 
provisions were severable, in light of the text and historical 
background.216  Therefore, the court concluded § 2241(e)(2) was 
severable from § 2241(e)(1), and would therefore bar Hamad’s action 
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C.  Is § 2241(e)(2) Unconstitutional As Applied to Hamad? 
 
Finally, the court examined Hamad’s arguments that § 2241(e)(2) 
was unconstitutional, and therefore should have no effect.218  Hamad 
argued that the statute unconstitutionally deprived him of a federal 
forum to seek a remedy for violations of his constitutional rights: 
“Article III demands some federal court review . . . over all federal 
question claims.”219  He argued that the Supreme Court has the 
“strongest of presumptions” against statutes that completely 
precludes access to federal courts for constitutional claims, and has in 
fact never upheld such a preclusion.220  Finally, Hamad argued that § 
2241(e) was a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers221 and 
that it precludes claims based on state law as well, thereby violating 
the principle of federalism.222 
The Court began its analysis by agreeing with Hamad that the 
Supreme Court has avoided whether Congress may deny access to 
federal court to seek a remedy for violations of constitutional 
rights.223  However, the Court also chose to avoid the question as 
well, stating that the Constitution does not require the availability of 
money damages, which is the only remedy that Hamad sought.224  
The court referred to the Supreme Court’s Bivens cases, noting that a 
Bivens damages remedy is “not an automatic entitlement . . . to 
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vindicate a protected interest.”225  The court then cited several 
different contexts where the Supreme Court declined to recognize a 
Bivens remedy.226  Thus, the court held that “money damages are not 
constitutionally required for every violation of constitutional rights” 
and thus § 2241(e)(2) is not unconstitutional as applied to Hamad’s 
claim.227 
Next, Hamad argued that § 2241(e) is an unconstitutional bill of 
attainder because it strips a discrete class of individuals, alien 
detainees, of access to courts.228  Under the Bill of Attainder 
Clause,229 a bill of attainder is any “legislative punishment, of any 
form or severity, of specifically designated persons or groups.”230  A 
bill of attainder has three elements: “the statute (1) specifies the 
affected persons, and (2) inflicts punishment (3) without a judicial 
trial.”231  Since a statute must demonstrate “‘unmistakable evidence 
of punitive intent’ before it may be struck down as a bill of 
attainder,” the main issue was whether the statute inflicted legislative 
punishment.232  Hamad argued that denying a class access to the 
courts is the type of punishment that has been historically recognized 
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as a form of legislative punishment.233  Hamad tried to distinguish his 
case from that of Nagac v. Derwinski,234 arguing that the statute in 
Nagac which restricted access to the courts did not fully restrict 
access, “only the exclusivity of which court could hear review” of 
veteran’s administrative decisions.235  Additionally, Hamad argued 
that the Congressional record showed that Congress intended to 
punish Guantanamo Bay detainees for exercising their habeas 
rights,236 whereas the record in Nagac did not demonstrate a desire to 
punish veterans.237 
However, the court rejected Hamad’s arguments, and held that § 
2241(e)(2) is not a bill of attainder.238  The court found Nagac 
persuasive, and cited it for the proposition that “[j]urisdictional 
limitations, such as the limitations imposed by § 2241(e)(2), do not 
fall within the historical meaning of legislative punishment.”239  
According to the court, the purpose of the statute was not to impose 
punishment, but to limit review of the ARB and military commission 
decisions.240  Since the court saw no “unmistakable evidence of 
punitive intent,” the court held that § 2241(e)(2) was not a bill of 
attainder.241 
Lastly, Hamad argued that § 2241(e) should be struck down as an 
unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
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Amendment.242  He argued that access to the courts is a “fundamental 
right,”243 and since § 2241(e) prevents access to the courts, it is 
subject to strict scrutiny.244  Hamad argued that because the statute 
prevents “enemy combatants” from bringing specified actions in 
courts, while imposing “no comparable legal disabilities” on anyone 
else, § 2241(e) would not survive strict scrutiny.245 
Considering Hamad’s argument, the court noted that the Supreme 
Court has never decided whether the Fifth Amendment protections 
apply to Guantanamo detainees.246  However, the court “assum[ed], 
without deciding, that the Fifth Amendment’s protections apply to 
aliens detained outside the United States” because according to the 
court, § 2241(e) did not violate the Due Process Clause.247  Since § 
2241 clearly made a distinction between aliens and citizens, the main 
issue for the court was what standard of review should be applied to 
the classification.248  While individual states have “substantial 
limitations . . . in making classifications based upon alienage,”249 the 
court noted that Congress has “broad authority” to make such 
classifications for a variety of reasons.250  Touching on the political 
question doctrine, the court noted that the authority to legislate, 
regarding aliens, is so closely tied to foreign policy and war powers 
that “[s]uch matters are . . . largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
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interference.”251  Therefore, the court decided to analyze the alienage 
classification of § 2241(e)(2) under the rational basis test.252  Under 
the rational basis test, the court reviewed whether the classification 
was rationally related to a legitimate government interest.253  In 
United States v. Lopez-Flores,254 the court applied the rational basis 
test to uphold the Hostage Taking Act, where certain conduct was 
criminalized when there was a foreign perpetrator or victim, but not 
when  either were United States nationals.255  In Lopez-Flores, the 
court found that the Hostage Taking Act was “clearly intended to 
serve Congress’ legitimate foreign policy concerns.”256  Like the 
Hostage Taking Act, Congress’s focus on alien detainees in § 
2241(e)(2) is the type of decisions that are “at the core of Congress’s 
authority.”257  The court found that Congress had legitimate foreign 
policy concerns that members of the armed forces would be targeted 
by damages claims for conducting the war on terror.258  Therefore, 
the court held that § 2241(e)(2) passed the rational basis review; and 
therefore,  did not violate the Due Process Clause.259 
Since the court rejected or dismissed all of Hamad’s arguments, 
the court upheld § 2241(e)(2) to preclude Hamad’s claim.260  
Therefore, the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and did 
not consider any of Hamad’s other arguments.261 
 
VI.  IMPACT 
 
This section explores the impact of the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of Boumediene on future claims by detainees.  The 
Ninth Circuit’s holding represents a broader issue that will have an 
                                                            
251 Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Mathews v. 
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, at 81 n. 17 (1976)). 
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 1006. 
254 United States v. Lopez-Flores, 63 F.3d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1995). 
255 Id. at 1470-72. 
256 Id. at 1470. 





    
Fall 2015 Hamad v. Gates  477 
impact on many future cases. Federal courts have been “categorically 
hostile to damages claims arising out of post-September 11 
conterterrorism policies.”262  Hamad represents an extension of the 
logic that the D.C. Circuit created in Al-Zahrani, which is, that the 
Boumediene holding only pertained to the jurisdictional bar on 
habeas claims and nothing else.  This section will explain the legal 
implications of Hamad, specifically, the court’s interpretation of the 
Boumediene holding, the implications of the court’s use of the 
severability test to uphold § 2241(e)(2) separately from § 2241(e)(1), 
and the court’s holding that rejected a Bivens claim for Guantanamo 
detainees.  This section will also explore the potential social impacts, 
especially considering recent government admissions that it tortured 
detainees and the actions of other governments around the world that 
have given money damages for detainees. 
 
A.  Bivens Actions And The “Special Factors Counseling 
Hesitation” 
 
The decision in Hamad interpreted the Supreme Court’s holding 
as only relevant to bars on habeas corpus claims.  However, many 
commentators believe that the Boumediene decision was much 
broader than the interpretation that the Ninth Circuit, and other 
circuits, have come to rely on Boumedine.  Joshua Geltzer argued, 
“the logic of Boumediene itself suggests that” the Ninth Circuit 
should have come to a different conclusion.263  Geltzer posited that 
there are five different manners in which the Suspension Clause and 
the Due Process Clause relate to each other: 1) habeas provides 
jurisdiction for federal courts, while the Due Process clause provides 
the basis for substantive rights, 2) habeas review provides the remedy 
to the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause, 3) habeas 
offers minimal due process rights of its own, 4) habeas review 
provides a structural guarantee to balance the powers of the 
government, while Due Process protects individual rights, and 5) 
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habeas is a form of equitable relief, while Due Process is distinct.264  
The Hamad court seems to have taken the first view, that the 
Boumediene decision was Suspension Clause specific, in that it only 
served to provide jurisdiction for the courts to hear the detainee’s 
cases, and nothing more.265  However, a more careful reading of 
Boumediene seems to suggest otherwise.  Much of the decision by 
the Supreme Court seems to emphasize that the Court wished to 
protect the separation-of-powers doctrine, and ensure that the Court 
would be the one to interpret “what the law is.”266  As Geltzer wrote, 
Boumediene “suggests that the decision emerged in significant part 
from an emphasis on ensuring that the political branches could not 
deliberately operate in the absence of the judiciary.”267  Thus, a 
reading of Boumediene suggests that Due Process protections should 
apply to Guantanamo detainees would not be inconsistent with the 
Court’s intentions in Boumediene. 
Despite this, the Ninth Circuit decided to limit its reading of 
Boumediene to only apply to habeas corpus jurisdiction, and nothing 
else.  This interpretation has had significant impact in the analysis of 
nearly every Circuit court that has heard non-habeas claims from 
detainees.268  The Ninth Circuit’s holding is therefore not anomalous, 
and it is likely that such an interpretation is likely to continue. In fact, 
in subsequent litigation, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning has been 
specifically utilized. 
Al-Nashiri v. McDonald is one such case where the Ninth Circuit 
has continued the logic which guided it in Hamad.269  Al-Nashiri 
involved a similar claim brought buy a former Guantanamo detainee 
seeking a Bivens remedy for violations of his constitutional rights.270  
In a brief statement, the court cited its previous decision in Hamad to 
uphold § 2241(e)(2) and bar jurisdiction to hear his claim.271  
Similarly to Hamad as well, the court used this reasoning to reject his 
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claim, without reaching the merits.  Just as in Hamad, the court 
rejected Al-Nashiri’s arguments that § 2241(e)(2) violated his rights 
to equal protection and constituted a bill of attainder.272  This case 
demonstrates that the decision in Hamad would continue to bar any 
sort of judicial relief for Guantanamo detainees. 
The court in Hamad not only upheld § 2241(e)(2) separately from 
§ 2241(e)(1), it did so by ruling that denial of a Bivens claim is not 
unconstitutional.273  The reasoning that the court used, however, and 
which has been used by the D.C. Circuit in Al-Zahrani, Rasul II, and 
most recently in Janko v. Gates,274  is likely to affect all future Bivens 
type claims in the future.  In Hamad, the court never reached the 
substantive issues on the merits of Hamad’s Bivens claim.275  Instead, 
the court held that money damages are never constitutionally 
required where constitutional rights have been violated.276  The 
problem with this holding, as Steve Vladeck points out, is that “the 
Supreme Court has never, in fact, squarely held that damages 
remedies for constitutional claims are never constitutionally 
required.”277  In every case that the Court has rejected Bivens claims, 
there has always been at least some form of remedial scheme.278  The 
detainees, under the decisions reached in Hamad and others, have no 
forum that they could seek a remedy–no federal statutory scheme nor 
any state remedies in torts or otherwise.  This holding suggests a 
reading that would apply in cases other than Guantanamo detainee 
cases: “if there is no constitutional right to a Bivens claim in all 
cases, then there can be no constitutional problem with Congress 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 As Senator Dianne Feinstein stated, it is important to remember 
“the pervasive fear in late 2001 and how immediate the threat felt. . . 
Nevertheless, such pressure, fear, and expectation of further terrorist 
plots do not justify, temper, or excuse improper actions taken by 
individuals or organizations in the name of national security.”280  The 
United States government has admitted that what it did in the years 
after September 11, 2001 to suspected terrorists constituted torture in 
contravention of international laws and the laws of the U.S.  Despite 
this, not one person who was responsible for this blight on American 
history has been held accountable.  The judicial hostility to damages 
claim by the detainees reflects a more general hostility by the courts 
to hold the government accountable for its counterterrorism 
abuses.281  These cases, though decided in the name of national 
security, put the American public at greater risk.  Firstly, they have 
the effect of condoning governmental abuses.282  Secondly, they 
create uncertainty, because the courts have not adjudicated the merits 
of the claims.283  And finally, the strenuous efforts of the courts to 
reject Bivens remedies for detainees may have the unintentional 
effect of encouraging the Government to preclude other meritorious 
constitutional claims.284  It is unlikely that the analysis that guided 
the Ninth Circuit in Hamad will change among the circuit courts 
hearing these claims.  A favorable Supreme Court ruling will likely 
only change the severe implications of these holdings. 
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